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NOTES
ACQUISITION OF JURISDICTION OvER FOREIGN EXECUTORS
AND ADMINISTRATORS IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
Introduction
In granting a motion to set aside service of process, a New York
court recently decided that it could not compel a foreign executrix to
proceed with an arbitration that had been consented to by her testator.'
The holding that the court lacked jurisdiction deserves consideration
because it points up what might prove to be a serious defect in the
arbitration law of New York.
At common law the courts expressed their disapproval of agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes by refusing to enforce them. 2 This
disfavor resulted from the apprehension that widespread utilization of
these agreements would diminish the need for judicial services.3 In
1920, New York became the first state to legislate effectively to en-
courage arbitration agreements.4 The change in public policy thus
manifested was the consequence of overcrowded court calendars and
the more modern attitude towards litigation which favors out of court
settlements between the parties to a dispute.5 Another ground for the
legislation was the recognition that businessmen arbitrators possess a
greater degree of expertise than the courts in factual commercial dis-
putes.6 Today, under the New York statute, an aggrieved party may
petition the supreme court to compel the recalcitrant party to honor
I Appeal of Gantt, 286 App. Div. 212, 141 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1st Dep't 1955).
2 See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1924);
Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 293, 169 N.E. 386, 389
(1929); Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 271, 130 N.E. 288,
290 (1921) ; President, Managers and Company of the Del. and H. Canal Co.
v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 50 N.Y. 250, 258 (1872) ; Horton v. Sayer, 4 H. & N.
643, 649, 157 Eng. Rep. 993, 996 (1859); Scott v. Avery, V H.L.C. 811, 825,
10 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1127 (1856) ; Simpson, Specific Enforcement Of Arbitration
Contracts, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 160 (1934).
3 See President, Managers and Company of the Del. and H. Canal Co. v.
Pennsylvania Coal Co., stpra note 2 at 258; Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377,
379 (1868) ; PRASHKER, Nav YoRK PRAc'icE 835 (3d ed. 1954).
4 Laws of N.Y. 1920, c. 275. See Simpson, supra note 2, at 166.
5 See Note, Time Limitations Under The Arbitration Law, 28 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 47 (1953).
6 See Schoengold, The Merchant-Today and Yesterday, 5 ARE. J. (n.s.)
130 (1950).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the agreement; 7 or, if an arbitration proceeding has been enteredi into,
the award made by the arbitrators can be entered as a judgment in
the supreme court."
Matter of Gantt
The instant case illustrates how ineffectual this legislative ap-
proval may be, given a not unusual factual situation. The decedent,
a resident of North Carolina, contracted in that state to purchase
lumber from a Nicaraguan company. The parties agreed that:
Any controversy or claims arising out of or relating to this contract or the
breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of
the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission. This agreement shall
be enforceable and judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrators or a
majority of them may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction. The arbi-
tration shall be held in New York, N. y.9
After a dispute arose, the seller commenced an action in New York
to compel the buyer (decedent) to enter into arbitration proceedings.
The defendant thereupon obtained a temporary stay so that the valid-
ity of the contract could be tested in a jury trial. Instead of pro-
ceeding with the action to determine the contract's validity, defendant
sought, and was denied, a permanent injunction restraining the plain-
tiff from enforcing the agreement.'0 The defendant subsequently died.
Seven years after denial of the permanent injunction, the plaintiff
moved to set aside the temporary stay and to compel the decedent's
executrix to enter into arbitration proceedings. On a cross-motion
to set aside service of process, the executrix prevailed; the court held
that because there was no property of the estate in New York, and
because the executrix was an officer of a foreign state, it lacked juris-
diction to grant the relief requested. It can thus be seen that if a
7 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT § 1450.
8 Id. § 1461.
9 Matter of Gantt, 297 N.Y. 433, 436, 79 N.E.2d 815, 816-17, cert. denied,
335 U.S. 843 (1948).
10 Ibid. In view of the holding of the instant case, it is interesting to note
that in denying the permanent injunction, the Court of Appeals held that the
non-resident's contractual consent to be bound by New York law was sufficient
to give New York jurisdiction. This is in line with prior authority. The Court
of Appeals has declared that: "[f]ew arguments can exist based on reason orjustice or common morality which can be invoked for the interference with the
compulsory performance of agreements which have been freely made. Courts
should endeavor to keep the law at a grade at least as high as the standards
of ordinary ethics. Unless individuals run foul of constitutions, statutes, de-
cisions or the rules of public morality, why should they not be allowed to con-
tract as they please? Our government is not so paternalistic as to prevent
them. . . Consent is the factor which imparts power." Gilbert v. Burnstine,
255 N.Y. 348, 354-55, 174 N.E. 706, 707 (1931). See Prosperity Co. v. Am.
Laundry Machinery Co., 271 App. Div. 622, 67 N.Y.S.2d 669 (4th Dep't 1947).
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non-resident contracts to arbitrate in New York, and later dies, the
agreement may be nullified, and the policy of the state as expressed
by the arbitration law frustrated."
Jurisdictional Considerations
Basic to the problem of this weakness in the arbitration law is
the common-law concept of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction means power.' 2
Juridically, it is the power of a sovereign to create rights which will
be recognized by other sovereigns.' 3 Of the various theories of juris-
diction,'4 "territorial jurisdiction" is the one that has been developed
to the greatest extent by the common law. Territorial jurisdiction
can best be explained by noting that each state has exclusive power
only over persons and property within its geographical boundaries.
The Supreme Court has stated that, "[t ] he authority of every tribunal
is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which
it is established." 16 The necessary corollary of which is that no state
31 The effect of the decision can be more readily appreciated if a New York
resident is imagined to be in the position of the Nicaraguan company.1 2 See Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 356 (1913) ; ef. Giles v.
Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). "The foundation of jurisdiction is physical
power. . . " McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). See Prashker,
Service Of Summons On Non-Resident Natural Persons Doing Business In
New York, 15 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 21 (1940).
13 Cf. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, supra note 12 at 353, 355-56; Kimball
v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 157 Mass. 7, 31 N.E. 697, 698 (1892) ; 1 BEAr, CoN-
Flicr or LAWS § 42.1 (1935) ; GOODRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 167 (3d ed. 1949);
RESTATEMENT, CNFLICT OF LAWS § 42 (1934).
14 Besides territorial, there are other concepts of jurisdiction:
(1) The injured sovereign: this idea embraces the thought that a state may
punish anyone who does it harm, no matter where they act. See Berge, Criminal
Jurisdiction And The Territorial Principle, 30 MicH. L. REV. 238, 265-66
(1931); II BORCHARD, CHAMBERLAIN, DUGGAN, THE COLLECTE PAPERS OF
JOHN BASSErr MooRE 305 (1944).
(2) Citizenship: this concept, borrowed from the civilians, proposes that a
state has jurisdiction over its citizens, no matter where they are. E.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 2381 (1952) ; 18 U.S.C. § 1019 (1952); 57 GEo. 3, c. 53 (1817). See Beale,
The Jurisdiction Of A Sovereigis State, 36 HARV. L. REv. 241, 253 (1923);
Berge, supra at 265; II BORCHAIR, CHAMBERLAIN, DUGGAN, op. cit. supra at
304-05.
(3) Cosmopolitan: according to this idea, every state has jurisdiction over
everyone, wherever they may be. See Berge, supra at 268. In addition, there
is the extension of the injured sovereign theory which holds that an injury to
a citizen of the state, without its territory, is an injury to the state itself. See
Berge, supra at 266-67, n.85. There is also the theory that certain acts are
punishable by every sovereign no matter where they take place, e.g., piracy.
See Berge, supra at 265, II BORCHARD, CHAMBERLAIN, DUGGAN, op. cit. supra
at 305.
IS Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877). "Considered in an inter-
national point of view, jurisdi-tion, to be rightfully exercised, must be founded
either upon the person being within the territory, or upon the thing being within
19551
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can directly exercise its power over persons and property without its
territory. ". .. [T]he laws of one State have no operation outside
of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and ... no
tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory
so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions." 16 Any
attempt to do so ". . . would necessarily be brutum fulmen in its re-
sult, and unconstitutional in its inception." 17
The above principles have been applied to situations wherein
jurisdiction over foreign representatives has been sought.' 8 Judge
(later Mr. Justice) Holmes pointed out that at one time the executor
of an estate took the decedent's property in his own right; 19 there
was then no reason for not permitting actions to be brought against
him wherever he could be found.2 0  However, since executors and
administrators have attained the position of court-appointed fidu-
ciaries,21 a different rule has obtained as to the maintenance of suits
by or against them. The New York courts, as well as the federal
judiciary, have long been guided by the principle that foreign execu-
tors and administrators lack the capacity to sue 22 or be sued 2 3 in
the territory; for, otherwise, there can be no sovereignty exerted. .. " STORY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 539 (3d ed. 1846).
16 Pennoyer v. Neff, supra note 15 at 722. "On the other hand, no sovereignty
can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits, to subject either persons
or property to its judicial decisions." STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 539 (3d ed.
1846).
17 Thorburn v. Gates, 225 Fed. 613, 616 (S.D. N.Y. 1915). "Every exertion
of authority of this sort beyond this limit is a mere nullity, and incapable of
binding such persons or property in any other tribunals." STORY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 539 (3d ed. 1846).
18 See notes 22 and 23 infra.
19 See Holmes, Executors, 9 H-Rv. L. REv. 42 (1895).
20 Pound, J., in McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 386, 148 N.E. 556, 558
(1925).
21 See McMaster v. Gould, supra note 20; Matter of Chichester, 185 Misc.
5, 6, 55 N.Y.S.2d 544, 545 (Surr. Ct. 1945); Matter of May, 172 Misc. 137,
140-41, 14 N.Y.S.2d 730, 733 (Surr. Ct. 1939); Matter of Vosburg, 167 Misc.
611, 613, 5 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
22 Dixon's Executors v. Ramsay's Executors, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 319 (1806);
Fenwick v. Sears's Administrators, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 259 (1803); Baldwin
v. Powell, 294 N.Y. 130, 61 N.E.2d 412 (1945); Vroom v. Van Home, 10
Paige's Ch. 549 (N.Y. 1844); Morrell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. 153 (N.Y. 1814);
Kerr v. Moon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) - 565, 571 (1824) (dictum); Doe v.
M'Farland, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 151, 152 (1815) (dictum) ; cf. Moore v.
Mitchell, 281 U.S. 18 (1930); see STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 513 (3d ed.
1846) ; STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 445 (2d ed. 1951).
23 Vaughan v. Northup, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 1 (1841) ; Burrowes v. Goodman,
50 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1931) ; McMaster v. Gould, supra note 20; Lyon v. Park,
111 N.Y. 350, 18 N.E. 863 (1888); German-American Coffee Co. v. Johnston,
168 App. Div. 31, 153 N.Y. Supp. 866 (1st Dep't 1915); McGrath v. Weiller,
98 App. Div. 291, 90 N.Y. Supp. 420 (2d Dep't 1904) ; Field v. Gibson, 20 Hun
274 (N.Y. Gen. T. 1st Dep't 1880); Matter of Webb, 11 Hun 124 (N.Y. Gen.
T. 1st Dep't 1877); Bennett v. Harrisville Combing Mills, 204 Misc. 279,
111 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. 1952) ; see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 512
(1934).
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their official status in any state outside of that which granted them
their powers. There have been several bases asserted for so holding.
In not permitting them to bring an action without first obtaining
ancillary letters, it has been said that the foreign executor or admin-
istrator has obtained his authority from a foreign state; that state's
laws having no operation without its territory, he has no standing to
represent the decedent in another jurisdiction.2 4  Moreover, if the
representative were permitted to sue, any recovery obtained would be
removed to the jurisdiction that had granted him authority. Domestic
creditors would thus be prejudiced by having to assert their claims
in the foreign jurisdiction, perhaps being subject to laws peculiar to
that locality. 25 It has been held though, that "as a matter of comity,
in the interests of justice," a foreign administrator can bring an ac-
tion to modify the amount of alimony payments that the deceased
had been required to pay his former wife.2 6 In Matter of McCabe,27
a foreign administrator, who was sojourning in New York and had
brought personalty of the estate with him, was permitted to move to
revoke letters of administration which had been granted by a New
York court with respect to that property. A foreign administrator
has also been allowed to maintain an action to obtain assets of the
estate located in New York, and in the possession of New York
appointed administrators.28 Without discussing the foreign source of
his office, the court in Matter of Davis2 permitted an administrator
to oppose probate in New York because of the construction of the
statute which permitted opposition by anyone "who is otherwise in-
terested in sustaining or defeating the will." 30 It should be noted
that the general rule may be circumvented by the representative's
transfer of an assignable cause of action to a resident for prosecution.3'
In addition, if the domestic debtor voluntarily pays the representative,
obviating the need for resort to the courts, the general rule is
inoperative.3
2
More pertinent to the instant problem is the rule barring suits
against foreign representatives except when there are assets of the
24 "By the phrase 'foreign executor' the courts never mean the mere non-
residence of the individual holding the office, but the foreign origin of the rep-
resentative character. That is the sole product of the foreign law, and, de-
pending upon it for existence, cannot pass beyond the jurisdiction of its origin."
Hopper v. Hopper, 125 N.Y. 400, 402-03, 26 N.E. 457 (1891).
25 See STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 512 (3d ed. 1846).26 Kirkbride v. Van Note, 275 N.Y. 244, 9 N.E.2d 852 (1937).
27 84 App. Div. 145, 82 N.Y. Supp. 180 (3d Dep't 1903).
28 Matter of Hughes, 95 N.Y. 55 (1884).
29 182 N.Y. 468, 75 N.E. 530 (1905).
30 Laws of N.Y. 1894, c. 118.
31 Harper v. Butler, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 239 (1829) (executor) ; Peterson v.
Chemical Bank, 32 N.Y. 21 (1865) (administrator).
32 See Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N.Y. 103, 112-13 (1859) ; Vroom v. Van Home,
10 Paige's Ch. 549, 557 (N.Y. 1844) ; STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 515 (3d ed.
1846).
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estate located in New York.33  In not permitting such actions to be
brought, the courts have reasoned that the executors and adminis-
trators are officers of a foreign jurisdiction; 34 therefore, any inter-
ference with the administration of the estate which they represent
would be a futile impropriety.3 5 The futility of the judgments and
decrees rendered would result from the fact that they could not affect
property of the estate situated outside of the state which pronounced
them.3 6 Indeed, foreign representatives could not bind the estate even
by consenting to the jurisdiction of the court.3 7
The instant case is obviously in harmony with the above prin-
ciples. It is thus evident that in order to repair the defect in the arbi-
tration law made apparent by the principal case, the legislature will
have to act. However, the way is beset with constitutional difficulties.
In order to draft a statute that will be both constitutional and
efficacious, it will be profitable to investigate other attempts to
extend, through legislation, the jurisdiction of the state over foreign
representatives.
Statutory Solutions
An interesting statutory evolution commenced in 1911, which
resulted first in the reversal, and later the modification, of the general
rule. In that year the legislature enacted Section 1836a of the Code
33". . . [I]n exceptional cases suits will be entertained against foreign ad-
ministrators where it is essential to the administration of justice, and an equity
suit for the purpose of determining the ownership of property within our jur-
isdiction in my opinion comes within those exceptions." Holmes v. Camp, 219
N.Y. 359, 372, 114 N.E. 841, 845 (1916) (The property involved was the share-
holder's interest in the capital stock of a domestic corporation.). See Callanan
v. Keenan, 158 App. Div. 84, 142 N.Y. Supp. 561 (3d Dep't 1913) (foreclosure
of a chattel mortgage); Logan v. Greenwich Trust Co., 144 App. Div. 372,
129 N.Y. Supp. 577 (1st Dep't 1911) (continuation of action allowed where
property was attached and defendant died before service of summons);
Montgomery v. Boyd, 78 App. Div. 64, 79 N.Y. Supp. 879 (1st Dep't 1903)
(enforceable right limited to property within the jurisdiction); Helme v.
Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363, 367, 128 N.E. 216, 217 (1920) (dictum); cf. De Coppet
v. Cone, 199 N.Y. 56, 61, 92 N.E. 411, 413 (1910) (dictum). Contra, Bostwick
v. Carr, 165 App. Div. 55, 151 N.Y. Supp. 74 (2d Dep't 1914). However,
actions can be maintained against the representatives on contracts which they
themselves made. Johnson v. Wallis, 112 N.Y. 230, 19 N.E. 653 (1889).
34 See Vaughan v. Northup, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 1 (1841).
35 McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 385-86, 148 N.E. 556, 558 (1925).
36 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) ; Thorburn v. Gates, 232 N.Y.
544, 134 N.E. 565 (1921). It is said in the comment to the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, Section 512 (1934), that the representative holds the assets
subject to the directions of the appointing court and is responsible only to that
court. For a court in another state to order payment from assets would be an
"improper interference" with the administration.
37 Burrowes v. Goodman, 50 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1931); Flandrow v. Hammond,
13 App. Div. 325, 43 N.Y. Supp. 143 (1st Dep't 1897); Judy v. Kelley, 11 Ill.
211 (1849); see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §513 (1934). Contra,
Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876 (1950). See note 60 infra.
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of Civil Procedure, which provided that foreign executors and admin-
istrators could sue or be sued in the same manner as non-residents. 38
In 1920, this statute became Section 160 of the Decedent Estate
Law.39  Construing Section 1836a in Helme v. Buckelew, 40 Judge
Cardozo indicated that the state, by an extension of comity, could
remove the disability of a foreign representative to sue in the courts
of this state. However, as far as removal of their immunity from
suit was concerned, he said:
If the purpose of the statute was to permit the recovery of a judgment which
irrespective of the consent of the jurisdiction of the domicile or of the presence
of assets within this jurisdictibn, would bind foreign administrators and execu-
tors everywhere as a judgment in personam, the statute registers a futile effort.41
In upholding the law's constitutionality, on a motion to vacate service
of process, the court assumed that the executor against whom the
action had been brought was within the state in his official capacity,
and that there were assets of the estate in New York that required
administration. In 1925, the legislature, ignoring Judge Cardozo's
dictum, amended the law to permit the continuation of an action
against the foreign representative of a non-resident defendant who had
died after service of process, but before final judgment.42 In that
same year, the case of McMaster v. Gould 43 squarely presented to
the Court of Appeals the question of the statute's constitutionality.
In holding it to be unconstitutional, the court stated that:
"Proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obliga-
tions of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due
process of law." 44
[ . * T]he purpose of the New York statute is to permit the revival of suit
against the foreign representative for a judgment in persontam without restric-
tion or qualification. It does not discriminate between a case where there are
assets and a case where there are no assets; between an attempt to reach assets
and an attempt to get a general judgment if personaM.45
In the following year, 1926, the statute was repealed entirely.46 It
was not until 1951 that the legislature, upon the recommendation of
the Judicial Council,47 re-enacted that part of the law which permitted
a foreign representative to maintain an action in the courts of this
state.
48
38 Laws of N.Y. 1911, c. 631.
39 Laws of N.Y. 1920, c. 919.
40 229 N.Y. 363, 128 N.E. 216 (1920).
41 Id. at 368, 128 N.E. at 217.
42 Laws of N.Y. 1925, c. 253.
43240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556 (1925).
44 Id. at 385, 148 N.E. at 558 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff).
45 Id. at 387, 148 N.E. at 558.
46 Laws of N.Y. 1926, c. 660.
47 1951 LEG. Doc. No. 26(A), REPoRT, N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 153 (1951).
48 Laws of N.Y. 1951, c. 522, § 1.
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Legislative provisions for proceeding against the representatives
of deceased non-resident motorists were more successful. In this field,
New York originally had a statute, Section 52 of the Vehicle and
Traffic Law, which provided for service of process on the Secretary
of State, as statutory agent for a non-resident motorist who had been
involved in an accident in this state.49 The Supreme Court held a
similar Massachusetts statute constitutional in Hess v. Pawloski.50
In that case, the defendant objected that there had been no personal
service on him and that there was no property of his located within
the state. Hence, the defendant asserted that the Massachusetts court
had no jurisdiction over him, and, in acting without it, deprived him
of procedural due process. In holding the law to be constitutional,
the Court reasoned that a state might make regulations in the public
interest to promote care on the part of residents and non-residents
who use its highways. The implied consent to be served was limited
to accidents growing out of the use of highways. In advance of the
use of a highway, the state could require the non-resident to appoint
one of its officials as agent to receive process. Furthermore, the Court
felt that the state could provide that use of the highways is the equiva-
lent of prior appointment.51 "The difference between the formal and
implied appointment is not substantial so far as [the fourteenth
Amendment is concerned] .... ,, '2 That the procedural require-
ments of due process, i.e., notice and hearing, were not ignored by
the Court became evident the following year in the case of Wuchter
v. Pizzutti.53 There the New Jersey "non-resident motorist" statute
was held to be unconstitutional because it did not require the state
officer, on whom process was to be served, to notify the defendant of
the institution of the action.
Although effective against the motorist himself,54 the New York
statute was held to be inapplicable where the non-resident died before
the service of process, 55 or after service, but before final judgment. 56
It was asserted by one court that, ". . . even if section 52 were to be
amended in terms to permit such service upon a foreign executor, it
would be futile in that aspect, for it would assume to subject such an
executor to a suit in personam in our courts." 57 Despite this dictum,
the legislature in 1945 amended the statute to provide both for ser-
vice of process upon the foreign representative of a deceased non-
resident motorist, and for the continuation of the action against the
49 Laws of N.Y. 1909, c. 30, as amended, Laws of N.Y. 1928, c. 465.
50274 U.S. 352 (1927).
51 Id. at 356.
52 Id. at 357.
53276 U.S. 13 (1928).
54 Shushereba v. Ames, 255 N.Y. 490, 175 N.E. 187 (1931).
55 Vecchione v. Palmer, 249 App. Div. 661, 291 N.Y. Supp. 537 (2d Dep't
1936).
56 Balter v. Webner, 175 Misc. 184, 23 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y. City Ct. 1940).
5 Vecchione v. Palmer, supra note 55 at 661, 291 N.Y. Supp. at 539.
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deceased's representative, if process had already been served.58 The
Court of Appeals held this amendment to be constitutional in Leighton
v. Roper.5 9 The court there established, to its own satisfaction, that
foreign representatives could bind the estate by consenting to juris-
diction.60 It then reasoned that since, under the Hess doctrine, the
68 Laws of N.Y. 1945, c. 719. This legislation was passed upon the recom-
mendation of the Judicial Council. 1944 LaG. Doc. No. 15(C), REPORT, N.Y.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL 239 (1944); see PRASHxER, NEW YORK PRAcTICE 185-87
(3d ed. 1954).
59 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876 (1950).
60 In coming to this conclusion, the court relied upon the following dictum
of Judge Cardozo in Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363, 367, 128 N.E. 216, 217(1920): "According to some decisions, an executor or administrator might
submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign courts, and the judgment would then
bind him everywhere (Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U.S. 215, 222; Chicago Life
Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 29... )." Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434,
440, 91 N.E.2d 876, 879 (1950). In the Lawrence case a foreign executor
brought suit under an Arkansas statute permitting foreign representatives to
sue. On a cross-claim, the executor was held liable. The decision was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Arkansas on a bill of review brought by the executor.
The United States Supreme Court held that the executor was bound by the
ruling of the Arkansas court because of his affirmative action in the case. The
Chicago Life Ins. Co. case did not involve foreign representatives. However,
it is similar to the Lawrence case in that a plea of lack of jurisdiction was
precluded by a party's affirmative action in taking an appeal. Judge Cardozo
had also cited Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 651, 655 (1906), and
The Newark Say. Institution v. David Jones's Executors, 35 N.J. Eq. 406(1882). The first of these two cases contains a dictum which supports the
proposition. There the New Jersey court relied only upon "13 Am. & Eng.
Encycl. L. (2d ed.) 961" as authority that such was the law in that state.
The latter case is a holding which supports the proposition. These cases, how-
ever, were not cited in the Leighton case. There, however, the court did cite
Beale, Conflicts of Law, Section 513.1 as authority. That author asserts that
the federal and New Jersey courts adhere to the proposition that a foreign
representative can confer jurisdiction by consent. He relies upon the four cases
already discussed, and in addition, Lackner v. McKechney, 252 Fed. 403 (7th
Cir. 1918). There, a bill for an accounting was brought by a foreign repre-
sentative, and it was held that by so doing, he waived immunity from all
claims against himself. Thus it would seem that when a foreign representative
is permitted to bring suit, and does so, a judgment rendered against him will
bind him. This is far from the proposition in the Leighton case, i.e., that in a
suit against him, the representative can confer consent jurisdiction. On the
other hand, in asserting that New York never felt that consent jurisdiction
was insufficient, the New York case of Flandrow v. Hammond, 13 App. Div.
325, 43 N.Y. Supp. 143 (1st Dep't 1897), cited by Judge Cardozo as a cf. to
the proposition which he asserted, was obviously overlooked. There, consentjurisdiction was held not to bind foreign representatives. It is believed that
the better authority and reason is that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the
consent of foreign representatives (see text at notes 61 and 62 infra). If
that be so, then their decedents cannot consent for them; thus the proposition
asserted in the Leighton case is untenable, and the decision incorrect. For an
amplification of this view, see cases cited in note 37 supra. See also Knoop
v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947), 33 IowA L. REv. 407 (1948) ;
36 IOWA L. REv. 128 (1950) (holding a similar Iowa statute to be unconstitu-
tional). However, in harmony with the New York Court of Appeals' decision
are Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 792, 171 S.W.2d 287 (1943) (holding a similar
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state could impose the requirement that statutory consent to substi-
tuted service be given by the non-resident motorist; logically, it could
further require that such consent bind his representative. In this,
it is believed, the court erred. No consideration was taken of the
fact that the representative does not stand in the shoes of the deceased,
but rather is an officer of a state 61 whose laws have no operation
without its territory.62  It would appear that the need for such a
statute, and not settled principles of jurisdiction, prompted the de-
cision of the court.
Although grave doubts as to the constitutionality of the statute
are entertained,6 the fact remains that it is the only enactment pro-
viding for suits against foreign representatives that has been held
valid. In order to extend jurisdiction over foreign executors and ad-
ministrators in the field of arbitration law, it would be advisable to
adopt the form of a statute which has been upheld. Thus the language
of Section 52 can be varied to provide that:
A non-resident who contracts to submit to the jurisdiction of this state for
the purpose of arbitration shall be deemed to have consented to the appointment
of the Secretary of State as his true and lawful attorney for the receipt of
service of process. He shall also be deemed to have consented that such service
shall be irrevocable and binding upon his executor or administrator. Where
the non-resident has died prior to the commencement of an action brought pur-
suant to this section, service of process shall be made on the executor or ad-
ministrator of such non-resident in the same manner and on the same notice
as is provided in the case of the non-resident. Where an action has been duly
commenced under the provisions of this section by service upon a defendant
who dies thereafter, the court must allow the action to be continued against
his executor or administrator upon motion with such notice as the court deems
proper.6 4
Conclusion
The proposed statute is conformable to the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of Section 52 in that, basically, jurisdiction is conferred
upon the courts of this state by virtue of the deceased's consent. It
Arkansas statute to be constitutional) ; Plopa v. Du Pre, 327 Mich. 660,
42 N.W.2d 777 (1950) (upholding the Michigan statute); Scott, Hess And
Pawloski Carry On, 64 H.Av. L. REv. 98 (1950); 2S CHi.-KENT L. Rxv. 347
(1950); 26 IND. L.J. 93 (1950); 25 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rxv. 907 (1950); 57 YALE L.J.
647 (1948).
61 See note 20 supra.
62 See notes 15, 16, 17, 24, 34 and 36 supra.
63 In this connection it should be recognized that the court disclaimed any
intention to determine the enforceability of its decree in the foreign state.
Rather, it merely resolved the conflict between established rules of jurisdiction
and New York's police power in favor of the latter. This conflict will remain
open, however, until the Supreme Court determines the efficacy of such a decree
in a foreign state.64 Cf. N.Y. VEn. & T.A". LAW § 52.
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differs from Section 52 in that, under the latter statute, the cause of
action arises in New York and the state has a valid objective in ex-
ercising its police power in protecting the life and limb of residents.
Here, objection may be raised on the ground that there is no reason
for the exercise of that inherent power. Further objection may be
made that the statute ". . . would involve us not only in problems of
constitutional power and complications of international usage, but in
a cumbrous and inconsistent and unworkable procedure which would
disorganize the scheme disclosed in other statutes, and there carefully
developed, for the administration of estates." 65
Whether the New York public policy which favors arbitration
agreements is strong enough to effectively eliminate state boundaries
in this area will, of course, eventually have to be determined by the
Supreme Court. It is not believed that a statute extending the juris-
diction of the state in this manner would be held to be constitutional.
However, the arbitration law will continue to be defective if an attempt
to correct it is not made; it will do no harm to try the remedy.
X
NOTIcE oF ATTORNEY'S LIEN-AcQuisITIoN OF LIEN PRIOR
TO COMMENCEMENT OF AN ACTION
Introduction
The common law afforded an attorney protection from the
"knavery" ' of his clients by securing payment for his services. This
was accomplished by two types of lien: one, the retaining lien on all
the client's papers in the attorney's possession, the other, the charging
lien on the judgment recovered through the attorney's efforts.2 These
liens were first created by the courts ".... in an effort to protect an
attorney from a client, who was willing to take the benefit of his
attorney's skill and labor, but who was unwilling to give anything
in return." 1
65 Cardozo, J., in Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363, 373, 128 N.E. 216, 219
(1920).
1 Goodrich v. McDonald, 112 N.Y. 157, 163, 19 N.E. 649, 651 (1889).
2 See Goodrich v. McDonald, supra note 1; Matter of Senitha, 252 App.
Div. 304, 299 N.Y. Supp. 407 (3d Dep't 1937), aff'd mere., 284 N.Y. 730, 31 N.E.
200 (1940) ; Ozorowski v. Pawloski, 207 Misc. 407, 139 N.Y.S.2d 31 (County
Ct. 1955). As far back as early Roman Law, an advocate had the right to
retain papers and instruments of his client until his fee was paid. See WEEKs,
A TaRATsE ON ArTORNEYS AND CouNsEuORs AT LAW 43 (2d ed. 1892).
3 Matter of Sebring, 238 App. Div. 281, 286, 264 N.Y. Supp. 379, 385 (4th
Dep't 1933).
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